Home to the original long Range Tamper evident patented ISO18000-6C/3, RAIN ISO17712:2013 compliant e-seal. The Only low cost tamper indicating e-Seal that can be audited from Manufacture to Destruction using RFID to secure the supply chain process!
Finnish Court Case highlights the need for more diligent seal integrity checking.
Read the article here
The Tenacent TIMSV11 e-Seal was successfully demonstrated as part of the EU CONTAIN project - The Customs oriented presentation may be viewed by clicking this text
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The Tenacent Inter-modal e-Seal and it's relevance to supply chain integrity: RFID for Source authenticity starting right at the factory and along the distribution channel!
The picture on the left demonstrates the popular installation methods with the preferred on the right hand side to prevent door removal. To see a short video on the seal and an example of a portal have a look at the video presentation here |
The case for low cost RFID e-Seals - A high level perspective
Seals have been around for as long as history can keep record with the intent to preserve the integrity of the sealed item between sender and recipient. More recently, containerisation became the de facto method of transporting goods and seal standards were published with the current benchmark, being the ISO 17712:2013 standard.
This standard is highly relevant because it not only outlines the base strength and other minimum characteristics of a seal, under Annexure A it outlines the production compliance requirements, supply chain security, distribution and identification management of the compliant seals.The standard was originally put together by individuals proficient in the shipping, security and the customs industry without any third-party technology agendas as seen in the poorly supported ISO 18185 standard. To clarify: Any competent local seal manufacturer, would be well equipped to forge a compliant seal without manipulation of the standard trending towards hidden IP thus focussing on none other than its primary objective which is to secure containerised cargo with a suitable serialised locking device.
We find this standard to be the best minimum container locking standard with exception of one point which is the ability of a customer to request seals with the same serial numbers opening up the possibility manipulation. We understand the rational but advise against this strongly as cloning of seals defeats the objective of a seal altogether. Whilst shippers generally keep to similar branded and serialised seals, no checking, at any stage, by any authority along an international route, is done to ensure that the same brand or type of physical seal is installed. Only the serial number is checked to ensure that the seal number has parity with the submitted documentation, however there is a significant possibility that it could be a different seal with the same number. Nothing practical, that uses visual or optical security features can be employed to prevent this in an operational context. We are of the opinion that a suitable low cost globally adopted RFID technology found in many supply chains and frequent traveller documents, has the ability to prevent this possibility.
Looking further into the complex environment of the global supply chain and the compliance to Customs processes, we have a number of further concerns that need to be addressed.
With the heightened security programs applicable to international trade, the collection of relevant data to ensure accurate risk profiling, non intrusive inspections and physical inspections, seals become highly relevant to the effectiveness in the management of these processes.
We have observed customs modernisation programs deployed where the automation ultimately lends itself to a paperless environment,however we now see a situation that virtual trades and cross border activities can take place without the physical goods having left a warehouse.This has massive implications to countries dependent on Taxes not collected on virtual exports where they would be due on goods legally residing in the local market. We are therefore of the opinion that a suitable technology needs to be deployed with a unique identity or digital signature that can irrevocably link a physical to a virtual transaction. That link must be reliably auditable with minimal human intervention with well defined standard operating procedures. Human intervention in certain customs processes raises risk significantly and lends towards bribery and manipulation. There is much documentation of the relevance of this threat especially in the 3rd world countries. The technology and associated product must have tamper or a disabling feature to prevent the use of the original RFID component on a replacement product.
At some point a container may be unpacked and its contents audited and verified and is common practice in countries where Non intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment is unavailable or non functional. The choice of container to be inspected could be random, due to a risk profile or a targeted inspection based on intelligence. The procedure is generally simple: the original container seal is recorded and checked with the documentation for parity, is destroyed and after the contents are verified visually, a customs seal is affixed. Whilst fairly simplistic, the level of accountability associated to the audit and those effecting the audit is concerning. A low cost intelligent seal can provide significant value to the audit procedure combined with an operating procedure that digitally records the event and the attributes of the event such as personnel involved etc. Historical events related to inspections could provide additional profiling data that could expose collusion between industry and officials or in turn provide positive data of a compliant trader frequently inspected without incident. Using the model as per ISO 17712, and the "Rotterdam Rules" the seal, apart from ensuring the integrity of the contents, could provide the backing data intelligence right back to the person that actually sealed the container thus placing culpability on that individual and entity responsible for misdeclaring or understating the contents, value and source of the goods.
This standard is highly relevant because it not only outlines the base strength and other minimum characteristics of a seal, under Annexure A it outlines the production compliance requirements, supply chain security, distribution and identification management of the compliant seals.The standard was originally put together by individuals proficient in the shipping, security and the customs industry without any third-party technology agendas as seen in the poorly supported ISO 18185 standard. To clarify: Any competent local seal manufacturer, would be well equipped to forge a compliant seal without manipulation of the standard trending towards hidden IP thus focussing on none other than its primary objective which is to secure containerised cargo with a suitable serialised locking device.
We find this standard to be the best minimum container locking standard with exception of one point which is the ability of a customer to request seals with the same serial numbers opening up the possibility manipulation. We understand the rational but advise against this strongly as cloning of seals defeats the objective of a seal altogether. Whilst shippers generally keep to similar branded and serialised seals, no checking, at any stage, by any authority along an international route, is done to ensure that the same brand or type of physical seal is installed. Only the serial number is checked to ensure that the seal number has parity with the submitted documentation, however there is a significant possibility that it could be a different seal with the same number. Nothing practical, that uses visual or optical security features can be employed to prevent this in an operational context. We are of the opinion that a suitable low cost globally adopted RFID technology found in many supply chains and frequent traveller documents, has the ability to prevent this possibility.
Looking further into the complex environment of the global supply chain and the compliance to Customs processes, we have a number of further concerns that need to be addressed.
With the heightened security programs applicable to international trade, the collection of relevant data to ensure accurate risk profiling, non intrusive inspections and physical inspections, seals become highly relevant to the effectiveness in the management of these processes.
We have observed customs modernisation programs deployed where the automation ultimately lends itself to a paperless environment,however we now see a situation that virtual trades and cross border activities can take place without the physical goods having left a warehouse.This has massive implications to countries dependent on Taxes not collected on virtual exports where they would be due on goods legally residing in the local market. We are therefore of the opinion that a suitable technology needs to be deployed with a unique identity or digital signature that can irrevocably link a physical to a virtual transaction. That link must be reliably auditable with minimal human intervention with well defined standard operating procedures. Human intervention in certain customs processes raises risk significantly and lends towards bribery and manipulation. There is much documentation of the relevance of this threat especially in the 3rd world countries. The technology and associated product must have tamper or a disabling feature to prevent the use of the original RFID component on a replacement product.
At some point a container may be unpacked and its contents audited and verified and is common practice in countries where Non intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment is unavailable or non functional. The choice of container to be inspected could be random, due to a risk profile or a targeted inspection based on intelligence. The procedure is generally simple: the original container seal is recorded and checked with the documentation for parity, is destroyed and after the contents are verified visually, a customs seal is affixed. Whilst fairly simplistic, the level of accountability associated to the audit and those effecting the audit is concerning. A low cost intelligent seal can provide significant value to the audit procedure combined with an operating procedure that digitally records the event and the attributes of the event such as personnel involved etc. Historical events related to inspections could provide additional profiling data that could expose collusion between industry and officials or in turn provide positive data of a compliant trader frequently inspected without incident. Using the model as per ISO 17712, and the "Rotterdam Rules" the seal, apart from ensuring the integrity of the contents, could provide the backing data intelligence right back to the person that actually sealed the container thus placing culpability on that individual and entity responsible for misdeclaring or understating the contents, value and source of the goods.
With the manual nature of the current seal solutions this would be impossible to achieve and the additional intelligence when coupled with an enabling technology starts significantly hardening the supply chain and integrity of associated data. Furthermore, an inspection event should be an event recorded in such a manner that it provides suitable visibility to a neighbouring transit country's enforcement program and should not jeopardise the integrity of the auditable link between source and destination of the cargo. An auditable process captured electronically with accountable personnel will significantly enhance downstream risk profiles.
NII are possibly the ultimate in cargo integrity checking. When the Inspection data is shared for comparison between neighbouring countries who also have the facility one could assume it failsafe. Due to the costs involved to deploy the technology, the facilities are in short supply and due to the volume of cargo passing these facilities, it is impossible to inspect everything with this method. What CSI and partnering nations did for the US, was to push the inspection responsibility to the country of origin. Once scanned with the host countries facilities, the container's seal is complimented with a seal issued with the relevant CBP staff. This low tech seal, subject to all the shortcomings of any similar seal is the mainstay of the container's integrity? Secondly in high volume land crossings, containers are misrepresented as have been inspected and are passed through systems as inspected. Surely an intelligent device suitable to indicate basic tamper, with the ability to store a secure digital signature verifying the event and inspection facility will add great value to that cargo's risk status?
NII are possibly the ultimate in cargo integrity checking. When the Inspection data is shared for comparison between neighbouring countries who also have the facility one could assume it failsafe. Due to the costs involved to deploy the technology, the facilities are in short supply and due to the volume of cargo passing these facilities, it is impossible to inspect everything with this method. What CSI and partnering nations did for the US, was to push the inspection responsibility to the country of origin. Once scanned with the host countries facilities, the container's seal is complimented with a seal issued with the relevant CBP staff. This low tech seal, subject to all the shortcomings of any similar seal is the mainstay of the container's integrity? Secondly in high volume land crossings, containers are misrepresented as have been inspected and are passed through systems as inspected. Surely an intelligent device suitable to indicate basic tamper, with the ability to store a secure digital signature verifying the event and inspection facility will add great value to that cargo's risk status?
The above visual aid represents the possibility of incorporating digital signatures into an e-Seal's memory allowing for the off-line verification of the data and processes undergone, by incrementing relevant Data on the e-Seal as it travels through the supply chain.
Industry has much to gain from the visibility this technology and methodology can offer in their own processes, starting from automatic Track and Trace to the automation of POD and automatic invoicing and payments. Greenlane methodologies for compliant and trusted trader programs can offer faster border traversal and cost to doing business by offering better turn around of resources. On the parastatals side, the efficient use of their resources can be focussed on the non-compliant The advantages can be directly related to a better bottom line. A great study on the SADC environment and technology can be downloaded here
Without presenting a thesis here and by highlighting the tip of an iceberg, it is obvious from the above and by doing your own research that the status quo of the current seals has to be reevaluated. We have chosen to support complementing the standards based ISO 17712 seal with ISO 18000-6C technology which gives us sufficient functionality coupled with a complimenting set of standard operating procedures and supporting systems to implement a military grade security solution. Sure there are technologies that are significantly more functional but we are ensuring that our product and associated infrastructure is the most financially palatable to industry whilst preserving integrity by auditing processes not new to the industry anyhow. What is required is the political will of the parastatals and compliant industry to support us in the strive for reducing the cost of doing business by offering the Green lane advantages to industry that support viable methodologies.
Since our inception in 2003 we have watched a very slow market evolve with many technology adopters backtracking from the original choices they had made.Its great to have all the functionality modern technology has to offer, but someone has to fund it and what value does a real-time notification in the middle of the desert with no response service to back it up have? Going back to the basics and getting the often overlooked obvious right goes a lot further than throwing unnecessary functionality at this type of problem. The most significant example of a backtrack is the pRFID program found at the USMC. An excellent article highlighting their decision can be downloaded here.
Further business cases can be researched and similar product offerings can be found globally. The most significant direct case would be the adoption of the technology and a product with similar features by the Taiwan Customs for transit cargo. A video overview of their implementation can be found at the following link.The passive RFID product depicted is very well suited for their application and legislated frequency of operation using a helical antenna separated from the RFID chip when unsealed. The disadvantages are the narrow bandwidth associated with the design and the inability to perform with similar characteristics in the European frequency allocations. The RFID functionality is also unavailable for the automation of compliance with Annexure A of The ISO 17712 standard. I have to commend the Taiwan government although for being leaders in their adoption and financial support of their local industry.
Feel free to contact us for any information you would like on the subject and hopefully we can keep our trade safe with the benefits associated with visibility and automation together.
Industry has much to gain from the visibility this technology and methodology can offer in their own processes, starting from automatic Track and Trace to the automation of POD and automatic invoicing and payments. Greenlane methodologies for compliant and trusted trader programs can offer faster border traversal and cost to doing business by offering better turn around of resources. On the parastatals side, the efficient use of their resources can be focussed on the non-compliant The advantages can be directly related to a better bottom line. A great study on the SADC environment and technology can be downloaded here
Without presenting a thesis here and by highlighting the tip of an iceberg, it is obvious from the above and by doing your own research that the status quo of the current seals has to be reevaluated. We have chosen to support complementing the standards based ISO 17712 seal with ISO 18000-6C technology which gives us sufficient functionality coupled with a complimenting set of standard operating procedures and supporting systems to implement a military grade security solution. Sure there are technologies that are significantly more functional but we are ensuring that our product and associated infrastructure is the most financially palatable to industry whilst preserving integrity by auditing processes not new to the industry anyhow. What is required is the political will of the parastatals and compliant industry to support us in the strive for reducing the cost of doing business by offering the Green lane advantages to industry that support viable methodologies.
Since our inception in 2003 we have watched a very slow market evolve with many technology adopters backtracking from the original choices they had made.Its great to have all the functionality modern technology has to offer, but someone has to fund it and what value does a real-time notification in the middle of the desert with no response service to back it up have? Going back to the basics and getting the often overlooked obvious right goes a lot further than throwing unnecessary functionality at this type of problem. The most significant example of a backtrack is the pRFID program found at the USMC. An excellent article highlighting their decision can be downloaded here.
Further business cases can be researched and similar product offerings can be found globally. The most significant direct case would be the adoption of the technology and a product with similar features by the Taiwan Customs for transit cargo. A video overview of their implementation can be found at the following link.The passive RFID product depicted is very well suited for their application and legislated frequency of operation using a helical antenna separated from the RFID chip when unsealed. The disadvantages are the narrow bandwidth associated with the design and the inability to perform with similar characteristics in the European frequency allocations. The RFID functionality is also unavailable for the automation of compliance with Annexure A of The ISO 17712 standard. I have to commend the Taiwan government although for being leaders in their adoption and financial support of their local industry.
Feel free to contact us for any information you would like on the subject and hopefully we can keep our trade safe with the benefits associated with visibility and automation together.